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Introduction 
 
At a theoretical level, there is scope to develop our understandings of 
displacement and resettlement and the relationship between local 
communities, civil society organizations and the state. Particularly relevant is 
the context and nature of efforts to rebuild livelihoods following displacement.  
Conceptually the current discourse broadly falls into two perspectives, 
reflecting work that has mainly been undertaken in relation to development 
and conflict-induced resettlement. The first is the managerialist perspective, 
which has as its central focus analysis of the need to manage the 
inadequacies and failings of resettlement by minimizing negative impacts. The 
second perspective is essentially critical of this mainstream approach. One of 
the main exponents of the managerialist approach is Cernea (2000), who has 
developed a resettlement planning and risk management model underpinned 
by support for development and the premise that it necessitates changes in 
social relations.  Emphasis however is on formulating strategies that use 
compensation and impoverishment risks and reconstruction (CIRR) as the 
means to reconstruct or protect the livelihoods of those subject to 
resettlement. This approach, in one form or another, is reflected in guidance 
from the World Bank and other agencies such as the UN, EU and Asian 
Development Bank. 
 
The policy premise underpinning CIRR methodology is that full payment of 
compensation at replacement cost for assets lost can achieve restitution of 
dispossessed assets and income sources. Evidence of resettlement projects 
based on CIRR indicate that mitigation measures have in fact failed to reverse 
the negative consequences of displacement resulting in some cases in 
extreme poverty, loss of livelihoods and violation of rights1 (Mehta 2004, 
                                                 
1 The numbers of people who are forcibly displaced by development interventions across the world are 
staggering and empirical evidence from different locales suggests that they also suffer loss of 
livelihoods and assets (house, land, social network, jobs etc) and increased risk of impoverishment. In 
 2
Dwivedi 1999, Mahapatra 1999, Oliver–Smith 1991). Recognising that 
resettlement policies can fail to protect those at risk, Cernea and the World 
Bank have suggested the use of short-term social protection policies as part 
of risk mitigation strategies that reconstruct the livelihoods of those 
involuntarily resettled2.  Within this policy paradigm, supporters of short-term 
social risk management, suggest that social protection could play a 
redistributional role to address market shortcomings (World Bank, 2001). 
 
The current policy paradigm: is it a framework for rights? 
 
The mainstream agencies’ conception of social protection diverges from the 
welfare policy associated with the 1970s and the social care model adopted 
by countries such as Sweden, that operate as a social contract at the 
national level and one through which the state provide goods and services to 
citizens to meet their basic rights entitlements such as free education for 
children, health services and social insurance.  Within the neo-liberal policy 
domain, ‘social protection’ instruments tend to be valued as a plank of short-
term risk management3. Protection is conceptualised within the limits of 
economic vulnerability and risk and in relation to income and consumption 
instability (Sabates–Wheeler and Waite 2003), resulting in selective public 
action that operates as social insurance and social assistance for the poor 
and vulnerable, at the times of crisis, such as when inflation rates are high or 
there is significant unemployment, or when there are other extraordinary 
external factors such as pandemic diseases e.g. HIV or natural disasters like 
                                                                                                                                            
India alone, more than twenty million people were displaced to facilitate development projects between 
1950 and 1980 and the majorities (75%) have ended up worse off than before.  In China, no less than 
40-45 million people have been displaced over fifty years (1950-2000) and more than 1 million people 
are being displaced by the Three Gorges Dam 
 
2 This is in line with the World Bank’s Involuntary Resettlement Policy OD 4.30 (1990), which was 
moderated in OD 4.20 (2001), which promotes analysis of risk and mitigation measures aimed at 
avoiding risk and/or minimise negative impacts, as a two phased process. The displacement phase, 
when the intrinsic risks that cause impoverishment become apparent is distinguished from the 
resettlement phase, when ways to eliminate or mitigate risks and negative impacts can be implemented.   
The first phase focuses on the process of displacement and the second phase covers the continuum of 
resettlement.  The ‘model’ identifies eight risk components of displacement which could lead to 
impoverishments - landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, increased morbidity; food 
insecurity, loss of access to common property and social disarticulation see Cernea  (2000).  
 
3 For different conceptions of social protection see Conway, de Haan and Norton (2002). 
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the Asian Tsunami.  Thus in relation to displacement we find social protection 
categorized as a short-term policy response rather than a vehicle for 
securing rights, with vulnerability defined in economic terms. Cernea, one of 
the exponent of this approach, argues for ‘economic of resettlement’ that 
require both ‘compensation resources and investment resources for financing 
resettlers’ development.  Broader speaking, it must articulate the full 
economic rationale and the tools for achieving the overall recovery and 
improvement of resettlers’ (2003:19). Cernea reduces social relations to the 
economic language of ‘assets’ and ‘capital’ and does not consider issues of 
rights, entitlement, access, in an economic, political or social context or the 
wider distribution of resources of various kinds that impact on the individual’s 
capacity to respond to vulnerability4.   
  
Integrating elements of social policy into resettlement risk models based on 
compensation, finance and mitigation may offer a remedy to some of the 
symptoms of inequality that impact on displacement. However, this reflects a 
limited understanding of social protection, which is aimed at tackling only 
transient poverty, and not one that would generate an effective policy to 
deliver rights and to reduce poverty in the long run for forced migrants. Short-
term protection measures are not geared towards providing solutions for 
underlying structural causes that shape inequality and conflict at the micro-
level. In practice, many of the factors that perpetuate the poverty and 
exclusion of displaced people and impinge on the actualisation of rights are in 
fact ‘external’ to individual projects and are structural in origin, such as lack of 
recognition of ethnic minorities, local social institutions, uneven patterns of 
land distribution etc. In social risk management ‘the crucial issue of how 
poverty is created and reproduced is lost.  Namely the failure to understand 
that poverty does not emerge because of exclusion but because of poor 
people’s ‘differential incorporation’ into economic and political processes’ 
Bush, 2004:23). What this means for the implementation of resettlement, is 
that, risk is inadequately conceptualized and managed in CIRR Mode. The 
                                                 
4  Cernea is critical of cash compensation on its own and argues for additional measures such as 
development-oriented investments  as a supplemental means over and above compensation resources to 
match the policy goals in resettlement. 
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rate of risk is likely to increase in displacement settings where there are 
contested issues that have historical origin and that are already a source of 
conflict and economic or social tension, although Cernea’s model tends not to 
include conflict assessment criteria into mitigation measures and risk reversal 
strategies.  
 
The need to penetrate the causes of poverty and exclusion when planning 
and delivering displacement policies is very apparent in the case of the Ilisu 
Dam in South East Anatolia, Turkey, which will displace an estimated 61,000 
people5. The Resettlement Plan of Action (RAP) of the Ilisu dam estimates 
that the dam, which involves the flooding of large areas including the historic 
town of Hasankeyf, will affect 184 villages (Export Credits Guarantee 
Department, 1999, Consortia For Ilisu, 2000). The policy adopted by the 
Turkish Government to manage displacement reflects the CIRR model with 
elements of social policy6. However, it is limited in the extent to which it 
reflects an understanding of complex structural issues, which are likely to 
impede the project’s implementation, such as local land disputes and 
problems in proving land tenure, as well as issues around the recognition of 
Kurdish ethnic identity, culture and social institutions. The Planners do not 
make reference to the fact that there is a high percentage of ethnic minorities 
in the region. The majority of the population of the dam area is of Kurdish 
origin with their own particular cultural and social institutions. Ethnicity is not a 
specific social factor associated with relative poverty in the area, but it is a 
factor in terms of social inclusion, that is the ways in which people may be 
denied full participation in society and full effective civil, economical, political 
and social rights (Morvaridi, 2004) 
                                                 
5 The Ilisu dam,  is one of 22 dams to be constructed along the Euphrates and Tigris river basin under the 
South East Anatolia Project (GAP). 12 of the GAP dams have so far been completed, and these have 
displaced more than 350,000 people, the majority of whom are of Kurdish origin. 
6 The Turkish resettlement programme offers three options for resettlement based on expropriation and 
compensation: Self-resettlement - people independently resettle following receipt of monetary 
compensation for assets lost (in the case of Ilisu each household get on average $25,000 depending on 
the value of their house, land and other resources); Government-assisted resettlement - a package that 
includes new housing and land in an urban or rural designated receiving area (financed through 
expropriation compensation and loans as necessary) and assistance in restoring the pre-resettlement 
income (average household  resettlement cost and compensation estimated to $35,000 (2000 prices); 
and Government credit-assisted resettlement – a package that allows people to keep their expropriation 
compensation and also have access to a mortgage loan (ECGD, 1999). 
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 Furthermore, the impact of the conflict between the state and the local 
Kurdish population has a direct bearing on the accurate assessment of 
expropriation and compensation of displaced people. This is compounded by 
divisive power relations in the area that reflect the structure of landholdings 
and result in conflicts such as forced land confiscation, family feuds over land 
and disputes between landlords and small property owners7. Claims are not 
uncommon, for example, that rich landlords have unlawfully taken land from 
nearby villages and refuse to restore it to the rightful owners who cannot then 
prove ownership. Many of these issues reflect limited individual agency - high 
social inequality perpetuated by a skewed distribution of land and resources; 
traditional social institutions, some of which are gender related; problematic 
land tenure and property rights and insecure proof of ownership (title deeds), 
all of which conspire to create exclusion and conflict8. Concern over human 
rights violations are also directly linked to the Turkish bureaucracy’s 
systematic denial of the political, social and civil freedoms of the indigenous 
Kurdish population, which have only relaxed a little in recent years. In practice 
Kurds’ are excluded (their ethnicity is not recognized) from full citizenship, as 
defined by rights to participate in decision-making in social, economic, cultural 
and political life.  
 
                                                 
7 Unequal distribution of assets in the area represents historical ‘political settlement’ and the domination 
of the institution of landlords known locally as Aga (landlord). These landlords perpetuate traditional 
kinship/tribal relations through patterns of common patrilineal descent and control through loyalty ties that 
impact on social and political relations and institutions. Tribal ties are highly influential in all spheres of 
life from political behavior to marriages and family structures. In the Ilisu area there are a number of 
villages where only one or relatively few families (Aga) possess all cultivated land, with the ownership of 
families extending beyond the boundaries of one village alone. 
8  Displaced persons from previous Turkish dam project have mostly resettled (80%) in large urban 
conurbations such as Istanbul, Izmir, Diyarbakir and Andana where they experience immense 
difficulties and receive virtually no support from the government.  The World Commission on Dams 
(2000) cites evidence that in many dam cases affected people have not benefited from the dams, but 
instead have continued to be plagued by negative social and environmental impacts, that have 
contributed to their impoverishment.  Many of these are policy related and have been ignored by 
project developers. These include inadequate compensation or no compensation in cases of insecure 
land tenure, real inequalities in compensation and, more fundamentally, violation of people’s freedom 
of choice. The Commission notes that: “only those affected people with legal titles were compensated 
for the loss of their lands and livelihoods. With such criteria for eligibility, indigenous peoples and 
ethnic minorities suffer disproportionately as they may lack citizenship, tenancy, or land tenure papers” 
(WCD, 2000: 105).  
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The objectives of the Ilisu dam are to increase available electricity power in a 
rapidly growing country and to reduce regional inequality and specifically 
poverty in South-East Anatolia. However, it is questionable whether these 
could be achieved while structural inequalities are not being addressed 
through a national development policy paradigm, which is driven by economic 
growth and a desire to catch-up with other European nations. Could it be that 
it is within the wider national strategy and policy framework that a rights based 
approach to development would need to act as a driver for change, rather 
than as a function of a displacement programme? Is the challenge not how to 
integrate rights into impact assessments or risk models, but rather how to 
ensure that the rights agenda is a driver for development policy and its 
macro/micro interface? 
 
Emerging critiques highlight a range of problematic assumptions that underpin 
the risk model, in particular the limited recognition of the influence of local 
norms, institutions and practices, including faith on civil society (Hann, 1996). 
The critical perspective questions the legitimacy of the risk model, raising 
concerns around fundamental political issues, such as rights and governance. 
This approach considers that the problem of prevailing risk based policies is 
that they treat displaced persons and communities as passive and 
unresponsive agents who are not able to exercise generative power to control 
their own lives and this reinforces their subordinate position in wider 
hierarchical political, economic and social power relationships (Kabeer, 2000). 
The potential of displaced people to transform their lives and to be productive 
through their own agency is constrained by barriers to ‘self-reliance’ such as 
lack of material resources, political power, and structural constraints like 
poverty and an oppressive political state. As it operates, the bureaucratic 
system within which displacement is managed and the legislative definitions 
and practices that it adopts tend to exclude local people and communities in 
the process of resettlement and hence deny them rights to protect their 
economic and social well being.   
 
The risk model tends to be based on a functionalist assumption that if certain 
risks are removed, poverty would be reduced and security would prevail. As 
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we have seen in the case of the Ilisu dam, risks tend to be structural in origin 
and reflect a series of rights abuses, such as lack of recognition of ethnic 
minorities, uneven patterns of land distribution and lack of political 
participation. And yet policy approaches to the management of displacement 
continue to promote short-term social protection measures, rather than 
policies that promote an understanding of the political economy of reform and 
set social protection within a national policy framework (Morvaridi, 
forthcoming). Barrientos, Hulme,& Shepherd (2005), in a critique of short-term 
solutions to poverty, persuasively suggest that social protection has both 
short-term and long-term roles to play in poverty reduction. In the long term, 
social protection assists people “to conserve and accumulate assets and to 
transform their socio-economic relationships so that they are not constrained 
from seizing opportunities by bonding or clientelism” (ibid:9) and also provides 
social assistance in cases where people are dependent on others, because of 
age, infirmity or disability. Thus social protection is the social contract at the 
national level through which the state provide goods and services to citizens 
to meet their basic rights entitlements such as access to education for 
children, health services and social insurance. Social protection tends to be 
framed in relation to citizenship, although human rights are universal and 
apply to all, including non-citizens - refugees, migrants, minority or indigenous 
groups that may be denied full citizenship, or women who may have lesser 
rights in both statutory and customary law, for example in relation to land 
ownership or inheritance. Any approach that is limited to citizenship will be 
inadequate to deliver social protection for all unless the granting of citizenship 
is also ‘human rights-based’. This requires the engagement of a diversity of 
agents in programmes that protect forced migrants rights and suggests that 
extending responsibility beyond the state is useful, but so long as the 
responsibility of the agents involved and the extent of their decision-making 
independence are clearly defined with state as a leading actor. 
 
 A broader vision for social protection than that incorporated into the risk 
policy paradigm, therefore could be opportune to secure the social, economic, 
political and civil rights of forced migrants. 
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The Synergy of Social Protection and Human Rights 
 
There has been relatively little discussion about how social protection could 
provide a framework for securing rights for forced migrants. However, there is 
a direct interface between the concepts of rights and social protection, the 
salient point being Article 25.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states that ‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical and necessary social services, and the rights to security 
in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or 
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control’. These values 
form the basic principle of rights that is to say the idea that human beings are 
fundamentally equal.  Social protection, as a means to deliver this equality, 
tends to be framed in relation to equal status, equal concern and equal 
opportunity for all.  
 
Basically the rights of displaced people tend to be articulated in four different 
ways.  The first is global obligation and inducement to secure rights, framed 
by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which Sen refers 
to as the ‘recognition route’ (2004). This establishes fundamental human 
rights in the context of forced displacement (in Article 14) and suggests an 
ethical dimension to rights rather than a purely legislative institutionalisation.  
 
The second route to articulate rights is through the legislative route and the 
application of ‘human rights laws’ that give legal force to certain rights in the 
UN declarations as basic human rights. These tend to be enacted by 
individual states and reinforced by social protection policies, or through 
associations such as the Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951) and its 
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1967 protocol, which defined refugee rights and the legal obligation of the 
state to protect them. For development induced displacement or IDPs in 
general, there is no such protection based on legal obligation. The need for a 
framework of international protection law and Universal Human Rights 
Conventions9 for border-crossing refugees is essentially because they have 
no state to protect them, whereas the status of the internally displaced is 
defined and protected by the legal frameworks of their own nation. A 
distinction is commonly made between refugees and the internally displaced 
based on legislative frameworks, masking the similarities of experience that 
they may share as forced migrants. This implies that a social protection 
framework could apply to settings of refugees, addressing many of the 
commonalities around impoverishment and vulnerability that Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) share with refugees. 
 
Unlike the protection accorded in statute to refugees, the United Nations 
(1998) ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ contains only 
recommendations (Deng and Choen, 1998) in respect of the protection of the 
rights and entitlements of those involuntarily displaced due to development 
projects or conflict situations. It places no legal obligations on states to protect 
IDPs, as their protection framework is that determined by the state for its own 
citizens.  It is not possible in the case of IDPs for the international regime to 
provide ‘protection’ in the sense that this term is normally understood. The UN 
Charter does not permit the UN to intervene in matters that are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, other than in special 
circumstances in which the UN resolves to place peacekeepers or peace 
                                                 
9 Legislative frameworks (international laws, human rights laws, legislations, conventions and treaties) 
embrace protection for refugees, setting their protection within the framework of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Under international protection regimes and international law 
states are obligated to protect non-citizens and those residing within their national borders, including 
refugees. In the context of the duality of the state versus the individual, a refugee is perceived to be an 
“unprotected alien”, that neither has the diplomatic protection accorded by states to nationals when 
abroad, nor do they have benefit from internal protection in their country of origin (Fortin, 2001).  This 
lack of protection has driven the need to establish a substitute system of protection, based on the 
manner in which a refugee is defined. Thus the concept of ‘international protection’ is used to denote 
protection that is directly accorded to individuals and groups by international agencies based on 
international conventions and international laws of human rights. This is the crux of the distinction 
between refugees and IDP, whose status, even if they flee their homes for the same reasons as refugees, 
is defined and protected by the legal frameworks of their own nation.  
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enforcers in a state. Thus, the protection offered to IDPs by way of the 
international community is limited to what might more commonly be termed 
humanitarian ‘assistance’, which does not constitute ‘intervention’, and this 
again tends to be short-term. There is an inherent conflict here with the idea 
of global obligations and universal declarations to secure rights, as it is often 
the state that has responsibility for the protection of IDPs that is a cause of the 
civil conflict that they seek protection from. The way in which states are 
obligated as a result of the human rights framework is more specific, with 
individuals clearly viewed as ‘rights-holders’ and states as ‘duty-bearers’. 
Such an approach puts at the centre of the analysis risks directly caused by 
the state (e.g. torture, corruption, discriminatory access to services), and the 
preventative, mitigating or promotional actions that can be taken to respond to 
various forms of risks whether directly provided or enabled by the state. Part 
of the issue is that the legislative definitions of entitlements and rights adopted 
by states and the bureaucratic systems within which forced migrants are 
supported tend to work against the most marginal local people, minorities and 
women.  
Many experiences of internal displacement occur in situations of armed 
conflict and civic war or where there is social injustice and unequal political 
freedoms. In the Ilisu dam area, during a long period of conflict between the 
Turkish state and the ethnic Kurdish population, more than 30,000 people 
were killed and over 3,000 villages were vacated resulting in the displacement 
of more than 2 million people10 (Yavus, 2001). Those who moved, both as a 
result of conflict as well development projects, to major urban conurbations 
have suffered impoverishment, living in squalid conditions, with little prospect 
of employment in a country where neo-liberal and structural adjustment 
policies have resulted in cuts in state public expenditure.  
                                                 
10 As a consequence of violent and armed confrontation between the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) 
and the state, most of the region has been under Regional State of Emergency Governance (OHAL) 
since 1980 and as such is not governed by the Constitutional Court but is subject to a stricter legal and 
administrative rule. Since the arrest of their leader in 1999, the PKK has changed its political demand 
for an independent Kurdish state to Kurdish identity, political participation and human rights. Despite 
this, much of the area remains under emergency rule 
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We cannot therefore ignore the third context within which rights are 
articulated, which is through the relationship between the sovereign state and 
the individual. The most important actor in the provision of rights and social 
protection is the state, as the welfare rights and protection of individuals and 
society remain within the jurisdiction and political power of the nation state. In 
its simplest form, protection of internally displace people becomes an 
extension of the existing policy framework. Since the 1980s states, ostensibly 
at least, have not operated independently however and this leads us to 
question whether the state can be the sole agent of justice and development. 
The concept of the state as the ‘primary agent of justice’ referred to in Human 
Rights Declaration 1948 and Article 3.1 of the Declaration of Right to 
Development (1986) requires explanation: ‘States have the primary 
responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions 
favourable to the realization of the right to development’ (UN, 1986). Several 
studies suggest that it is no longer appropriate to attribute effective and 
legitimate power solely to states, as increasingly responsibility is devolved to 
a variety of local and non–state actors, (such as NGO’s, the private sector 
etc) in particular where states are weak, unjust or unwilling to act (Kuper, 
2005). The multiplicity of actors involved in displacement and resettlement 
supports the view that it is no longer clear who the agents of justice are and 
who has the responsibility to protect the rights of the individual, and in 
particular the poorest and most vulnerable. Social justice scholars, who 
promote a responsibility approach to human rights for global justice, have 
recently argued for the need to deconstruct the Declaration of Human Rights 
1948 and 1951 Convention on the grounds that it is unworkable because it is 
based on the state being the only agent responsible to bear rights. This no 
longer seems appropriate in the globalised world that we live in where a 
multiplicity of agents, institutions and agencies seek to provide the 
administration necessary to protect and nurture human rights (O’Neill 2001, 
Pogge 2002). In reconstructing the Declaration, it is argued that the state 
needs to be involved in partnerships with others agents such as non-
government organizations, global institutions and the private sector to deliver 
rights and social protection.  
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This requires less government and more governance. A multi-agency 
approach through which public bodies, voluntary organisations and informal 
networks assist communities, households, private companies and individuals 
to manage and overcome risks and vulnerabilities is perhaps a necessary 
response to globalisation. Such an approach to deliver rights focuses on less 
government and more governance or dispersed governance, based on multi 
level networks and partnerships. The engagement of a diversity of agents in 
programmes that protect forced migrants rights suggests that extending 
responsibility beyond the state is useful, but so long as the responsibility of 
the agents involved and the extent of their decision-making independence are 
clearly defined11. The critical concept here is partnership and how it can 
enhance capacity.  
In the case of resettlement associated with development projects, such as 
dams, the private sector tends to regard displacement and resettlement as the 
responsibility of the state. The private sector does not operate social 
programmes for poverty reduction and responsible management of resources 
to address wider inequalities. However, an increasing awareness of the need 
for the private sector to promote corporate social responsibility becomes 
evident when we look at the environmental, social and economic costs of 
resettlement in the case of the Ilisu dam, private companies involvement in 
the project and their subsequent withdrawal.  
In 1997 the Government, through the Agency for State Hydraulic Works (DSI) 
invited Sulzer Hydro of Switzerland to lead a consortium, which involved 
BalfourBeatty  (UK and USA), Impregilo (Italy), Skanska (Sweden), ABB 
Power Generation, Sulzer Hydro (Switzerland and Austria) and the Turkish 
companies, Nurol, Kiska and Tekfen, to build the power plant at Ilisu.  
Contractors in the consortium approached Export Credit Agencies (ECA) of 
their own countries to underwrite support for their involvement in the project, 
as financial guarantors against the risk of non-payment (Export Credit Agency 
                                                 
11 In most European states local networks of public, private voluntary/charitable providers are now 
charged with meeting the basic needs of forced migrants and provide a classic example of the complex 
patterns of devolved governance that characterise the dispersed state. 
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UK, 1999). A social impact assessment report, sponsored by ECGD, 
concluded that the Ilisu Dam project faced challenging and complex 
development issues that could not be tackled at the project level alone – such 
as structural poverty and gender and ethnic discrimination. A need to address 
these at wider policy level was identified; otherwise risks to social and human 
rights would not be adequately mitigated at project level. This required 
political commitment to ensuring that the project was fully inclusive and 
allowed all local people to benefit from the project in the long-term.  
 
The Ilisu dam project provides a good example of how different routes to 
articulating rights converge. The involvement of international consortia and 
national credit agencies allowed for conditions to be set for credit funding 
approval linked to rights.  These include for example a need to address 
property rights and land tenure issues, provide for customary rights to land, 
ensure citizen rights and a participation strategy that involved all stakeholders 
in decision-making. To ensure that property rights and land tenure issues 
were identified, a cadastral survey was required that detailed land ownership 
in anticipation of compensation, recognised inequalities in access to land by 
gender and established processes to mediate conflict.  Due processes were 
required for the accurate assessment of compensation for customary land 
rights based on uses of postural land (by all groups), even though the existing 
constitutional law does not recognise pastural land as a property of 
community.  
International guidelines recommend that any legal steps considered 
necessary to ensure the effective implementation of resettlement activities 
under a project should include a process for recognizing claims of rights to 
land that derive from customary law and traditional usage (see OECD 
Guidelines and the World Bank OP 4.30). For the purposes of the allocation of 
compensation, international guidelines treat formal and customary rights to 
land or other resources equally. This is particularly important in the context of 
women in Turkey who do not inherit land or have formal rights to land due to 
social custom and rarely make a legal challenge to this exclusion. Although 
women are eligible for compensation, in reality the majority will not receive 
any. Because the average household size is over 7 in the region, the 
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Resettlement Action Plan survey concludes that 82% of women are 
‘housewives’ dedicated to domestic work and childrearing (DSI, 2000). 
However it is well documented, and reported elsewhere, that women in this 
region provide the most active rural labour force in the villages, and are 
involved in farm labour, livestock management and gardening. Despite this, 
few women own resources such as land, and most are only eligible for 
compensation therefore as housewives.  
 
A Consultation/Participation strategy was requested that ensured local people 
(both the displaced and host communities) could contribute to the decision-
making and planning process.  Perhaps most importantly of all, funding 
conditions insisted that social exclusion was addressed and that the rights of 
ethnic minorities, including social and cultural institutions and social networks, 
were reflected in the planning process. This is particularly important given the 
context of social and political conflict and human rights concerns of Kurdish 
people in the region. 
 
In November 2001, Balfour Beatty pulled out of the Ilisu project on the 
grounds that the Turkish authorities had made limited progress in relation to 
the above conditions including social and environmental impacts of the project 
(Balfour Beatty Press Release, November 2001)12. The World Commission on 
Dams provides guidance on how projects such as Ilisu already in the 
“pipeline” can produce improved outcomes and meet the Commission’s core 
values. This requires systematic, open and participatory reviews of projects, 
such as Ilisu, and the political will to accommodate changes considered 
necessary to meet international best practice, including adequate resourcing. 
                                                 
12 The transnational network, civil society groups and associations claimed a victory, which according 
to Friends of the Earth in a press communiqué was: “a tremendous win for campaigners against a 
disastrous dam project. Balfour Beatty's very welcome decision to drop out of the project shows the 
power of shareholder pressure and publicity campaigns by groups like Friends of the Earth and the Ilisu 
Dam Campaign. The story of the Ilisu Dam project shows the need for laws which require British 
companies to adopt clear ethical and environmental standards in their work abroad as well as at home. 
Certainly, backing such an export credit should never even be considered in cases which involve such 
obvious environmental destruction and abuse of human rights.” (Friends of the Earth Press Release, 
November 2001). 
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Balfour Beatty withdrew from the Ilisu consortium over concerns around the 
Turkish state agencies’ capacity to fulfill the ECA’s funding conditions and in a 
timely fashion that did not add to project costs given the bureaucratic 
machinery. This decision was also influenced by a very public campaign by 
civil society organisations that objected to the human rights issues associated 
with the displacement programme, in particular abuses of the Kurdish 
minority, and the lack participation of affected people in the planning process.   
 
 
Civil Society, Rights and Displacement 
This brings us to the fourth route through which the rights of the displaced are 
articulated - the advocacy or ‘agitation route’, the involvement of individuals 
and groups and civil society organisations calling for the protection of the 
rights of forced migrants. Over the past three decades an increasing number 
and diversity of transnational organizations, including local and international 
NGOs, frame protest within a rights context. Struggle for social and economic 
rights that are inclusive and participatory underpins much of the growing 
opposition to displacement typified by transnational networks; whose protests 
represent new sources of agency in the form of activists with human rights 
based objectives.  There is a growing opposition to projects that involve 
forced displacement and do not promote rights to social and economic 
development that is inclusive and participatory (see Morvaridi, 2004). This is 
typified by the protest of transnational networks that comprise activists with 
environmental, ecological, feminist and human rights based objectives. These 
new sources of agency challenge the state, the private sector and 
development actors to operate within an institutional environment that creates 
inclusive opportunities that empower all displaced people, including the poor 
and the marginalized, to shape and mediate their entitlements and social, 
economic, cultural and political rights. In so doing they in fact challenge the 
wider national and regional development policy context and in particular 
governments’ policies towards civil society 
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The protest movement is typically a weapon of the weak and marginal who 
are excluded from mainstream civil society, but who seek to challenge, 
change or influence public policies and international protection regimes. In 
short protest is a strategy employed by those who are relatively powerless 
within the existing social and political structure to secure their own protection 
and social and economic rights. Effectively forced migrants have been actively 
involved in demanding entitlements and rights for social protection. A number 
of large dam projects in India, China and Brazil have been subjected to 
challenge by civil society organisations for the rights of resettled people to 
protection of their livelihoods and identity. The Ilisu dam project has been 
faced with considerable resistance from local and transnational lobby groups 
who have adopted a rights framework as a basis for claiming social justice. 
Where local protest actions are largely ignored by state institutions or actively 
contained or suppressed leaving local movements politically weak, it is 
increasingly common for alternative communicative structures and 
international networks to provide the fora through which their concerns can be 
presented.  The key contentious issues that formed the focus of the 
transnational campaign networks against the Ilisu dam fit broadly into two 
groups – human rights concerns around resettlement and in particular impacts 
on the Kurdish population and negative environmental impacts of the dam 
(river pollution, spread of disease, violation of UN Convention on the Non-
Navigational Uses of Transboundary Watercourses). Local concerns over the 
politics of identity, place and displacement feed into the wider Kurdish ethnic 
question, and the social networks of the established Kurdish diaspora and 
Kurdish Human Rights movements based in Europe provided a transnational 
network through which local protests could scale up their actions and in so 
doing challenge the limits of national boundaries and local restrictions. The 
priority of Kurdish organizations is the protection of human rights and the 
rights of all to development within the Kurdish regions13.  More generic 
                                                 
13 Different tactics and activities utilized to target national governments and private companies and 
intergovernmental institutions. These activities range from letter campaigns to senior government 
personnel (Prime Ministers, MPs), parliamentary select committee reports, lobbying of private 
companies including shareholders, organizing concerts and involving the mainstream media. More than 
180 items on the Ilisu dam were published in mainstream newspapers globally from 1999 to 2000, a 
sample of which are shown in Table 3. The themes and titles of these articles reflect the activities of the 
campaigners of the transnational network that highlighted the deficiencies and failings of the Turkish 
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concerns over displacement and environmental issues are global issues that 
many International NGO’s and individuals express commitment to challenge.  
A network of campaigners and NGOs lobbied against the dam, citing 
contentions around human rights, and social and environmental problems, in 
order to secure local people’s rights to development. Some of the key 
organizations and actors that were part of transnational networks are Friends 
of the Earth, Amnesty International.  
 
Political Will – the Key to Rights and Social Protection   
The extent to which different routes to articulating rights are effective depends 
in reality, on the interpretation that states place on rights and the extent of the 
political will to provide protection. The use of social protection as a short-term 
targeted interventionist policy to address crises or market failings reflects the 
domination of the neo-liberal policy domain. Neo-liberal market policies 
encourage states to restructure the economy in the direction of a reduction in 
state intervention. Each new economic measure effectively results in a cut 
back in public expenditure, reducing the state’s capacity to coordinate national 
economic and social protection programmes. Used in the context of 
development programmes, we find that social protection suggests a rather 
broad framework for covering a wide range of programmes and instruments to 
address long-term, in preference to alternatives short-term systems such as 
social security, social insurance or safety nets (Sabates–Wheeler and Waite 
2003). Within this context we find displacement policy frameworks that fail to 
protect the rights of the internally displaced, because they are viewed as 
“problems, victims and recipients of charity” (Mehta: 2003:3) that require 
short-term responses, rather than individuals with rights and entitlements. 
This is particularly the case when social protection instruments that are 
provided (e.g. targeted cash transfers or social funds, compensation) are 
based on charity, rather than social justice and equal rights and entitlements.    
Social protection can however work to protect the displaced where states are 
                                                                                                                                            
government’s development model and policy to tackle contentious issues (as discussed above) in order 
to pressurize western companies and governments associated with the project into withdrawing their 
support. 
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committed to providing the necessary grounds to take public action ‘in 
response to levels of vulnerability, risk, and deprivation which are deemed 
socially unacceptable within a given polity or society” (Conway, de Haan et al. 
2000). Social protection in Europe, for example, has been promoted through 
‘welfarism’. 
  
In both developed and developing countries, a wide range of stakeholders, 
programmes and institutions, and instruments, are engaged in the provision of 
social protection through both formal policies (social insurance programmes, 
health and education) and informal means (social networks and intra-
household support). That increasingly governments are devolving 
responsibility for the provision of forced migrants’ welfare to an array of public 
and private organizations at both regional and local levels, does not 
necessarily reflect greater commitment to protection for forced migrants. In 
most cases it reflects attempts to contain the amount of welfare accessible to 
them, with the voluntary/informal sector essentially left to ‘pick up the pieces’. 
The notion of governance allows for a free market approach to welfare reform 
to be considered as ‘good’ governance rather than retrenchment (Hewitt de 
Alcántara, 1998).  Thus it complements neo-liberal economic programmes 
that make it difficult for governments to expand their intervention or 
economically to support welfare measures while having to comply with 
adjustments or conditional lending. 
 
Clarke (2004:37) argues, however, that the concept of the ‘dispersed state’ 
induces fragmentation in ‘service provision, multiplying the number of agents 
and agencies involved, increasing the number of (micro) decision-making 
settings and generating new problems of coordination, regulation and 
scrutiny. A further problem with a multi-agency approach is that where weak 
states lack the capabilities to be the primary agents of justice, there are rarely 
other local agents or agencies that have the ‘missing capabilities’. More 
importantly, the delivery of rights is dependent on the political will to enforce 
them and this continues to operate at a national level.  
A critical element of social protection is that public policy expands or 
enhances the individual’s agency as constructed by their social position ‘in 
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relation to wider forms of stratification and social relations of power’ (Lister, 
2004). Within the policy paradigm, there is therefore a challenge to states to 
address structural factors that cause exclusion and poverty and restrict the 
individual’s agency to actively shape and contribute to the betterment of his or 
her own life and economic development (Sen, 1999). Delivery of social 
protection is complex but what we are seeing is a more distinctive social 
protection agenda articulated through a wide range of stakeholders.  That 
social protection is considered to have the potential to be a more enduring 
interventionist policy to address poverty and secure rights is clear from recent 
work on protection, which is for this reason differentiated from earlier work 
(Barrientos, Hulme, & Shepherd 2005, Devereux, 2004, Conway, de Haan 
and Norton, 2002, Hall and Midgley, 2004). 
 
In both developed and developing countries, host communities are often 
resistant to the full integration of displacees. One of the strongest opposing 
arguments to social protection for forced migrants is that as a form of income 
distribution, social protection unfairly redistributes wealth and opportunities 
(jobs, housing, benefits) from the active working population to those who are 
unemployed or poor. In the absence of social protection policies in developing 
countries, providing jobs or land to people just because they have been 
displaced is problematic for host societies that are also likely to experience 
high unemployment, poor health infrastructure and poverty. There also 
appears to be political incompatibility between the activities of the large 
development donor agencies, committed to conditionality and expenditure-
reducing development policy, and commitment to a framework of social 
protection that is long-term and costly. It is within this context that the concept 
of protection for forced migrants is highly contentious and is much discussed 
within the policy discourse (Harrell - Bond, 1986, Crisp, 1999, Chimni, 2001, 
Fortin, 2001, Castles 2003, Mehta, 2003, Gibney, 2004). This brings us back 
to the fundamental issue that implementing social protection and rights-based 
development is not always simply a lack of financial and administrative 
capacity, as Hickey points out in a discussion of social protection in Africa but 
‘‘it is the lack of a political contract for social protection between states and 
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citizens around issues of social protection that constitutes arguably the largest 
barrier’ (2005: 25). 
 
Many of the injustices encountered by forced migrants suggest that there is 
an institutional denial of their basic rights, but does it necessarily follow that a 
social protection framework would deliver rights and contribute to rights-based 
development? As Harrell Bond suggests – “it’s simply not this straightforward, 
for who is actually responsible for upholding rights?” (2002:76). While 
northern states have the capacity to offer social protection measures to 
deliver rights (even if they choose not to), developing countries tend to be less 
well placed. Poverty Reduction Programmes (PRSPs) aimed at achieving 
social protection for the vulnerable and the poor in over 70 developing 
countries have not addressed the problems faced by those involuntarily 
displaced (Marcus, and Wilkinson, 2004). The main focus and priority of 
PRSPs is income poverty, while other deprivation concerns linked to forced 
migrants (gender inequality, rights, nutrition etc) are ignored or treated as 
secondary (Conway and de Hann, 2002: 26). In a similar vein, the Millennium 
Declaration makes only one reference in passing to forced migrants as 
vulnerable populations, requesting that states ‘strengthen international 
cooperation, ….to help all displaced persons to return voluntarily to their 
homes, in safety and dignity, and to be smoothly reintegrated into their 
societies’ (UN 2005). 
 
Conclusion  
This paper has set out with the premise that good research should inform 
policy to the betterment of displaced persons. The challenge is arriving at a 
conceptual and policy paradigm that has the potential to increase the agency 
of the uprooted.  Social protection offers a conceptual and policy paradigm 
that has the potential to increase the agency of displaced people, rather than 
reproduce the constraints upon them, and to blur the dualism between relief 
and development, thus departing from short-term protection measures. In the 
context of globalisation, we need to factor in the engagement of a diversity of 
agents in programmes that protect forced migrants rights, which suggests the 
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need to reconfigure where the delivery of rights rests.  The critical concept 
here is one of partnership and how it can be used to enhance capacity but its 
potential as a poverty reducing strategy is dependent on the state, as the 
primary agent for the protection and enforcement of both individual and 
collective rights. Social protection places responsibility on the state to 
enhance the individual’s agency to actively shape his or her own life and 
therefore challenges structural factors that cause exclusion. This is not 
reflected in current policy approaches to the management of displacement, 
which focus on short-term risk management as part of individual projects, 
rather than an approach that promotes an understanding of the political 
economy of reform and strengthens social protection within the policy 
framework. That many of the contentions associated with forced displacement 
are structural or political in origin should drive us to consider a rights-based 
approach within the wider national strategy and policy framework. However, 
the political context is likely to have the most significant bearing on the 
implementation, success and sustainability of social protection – and issues of 
development more broadly.  
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